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"VIETNAMIZATION" MEANS NOT TO END THE WAR BUT TO DRAG IT ON

Says DRVN Vice-Premier in Answer to AP Interview

ON Feb. 26, 1970, Vice-Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh received Mr. Daniel De Luce, Assistant General Manager of the Associated Press *and Mrs. Alma De Luce. An interview was granted by him on this occasion to Mr. De Luce.*

Follows the full text of questions and answers:

Question I:

Has your Government noted any difference in United States policy toward the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam between the administrations of President Johnson and President Nixon?

Answer:

The Johnson Administration led the United States into the path of expanding and escalating the war; it committed over half a million US troops for aggression against South Viet Nam, and conducted an air and naval war of destruction against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. But having sustained heavy defeats in the two zones of our country, it had to enter into talks with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, to stop unconditionally the bombing raids and all other war acts against the latter, and accept the holding of a four-party conference in Paris to discuss a settlement of the Viet Nam problem. Had Mr. R. Nixon kept the promise he made to his electors during the presidential election campaign, the Paris Conference would have provided a good chance for the United States to pull out of the Viet Nam war.

However, in the past year and more, the Nixon Administration has, on the one hand, blocked progress at the Paris Conference and downgraded it; on the other hand, it has made every effort to carry out the "Vietnamization" plan, to continue the war by the agency of puppet troops gradually replacing US combat forces. The "Vietnamization" means not to end the war but to drag it on, and to prolong the US military occupation of South Viet Nam. Further, the Nixon Administration has stepped up the "special war" in Laos; lately it has gone so far as to launch massive B.52 bombings, devastating the Plain of Jars and many other areas in Laos, it has thus made the situation in Laos even more tense. At the same time, it has kept sending US-puppet armed forces to brazenly violate the borders and territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

The piecemeal troop withdrawals and deceptive statements by the Nixon Administration cannot conceal the fact that it is continuing and intensifying the war, trying to hold on to South Viet Nam in order to carry out neo-colonialism and to prolong the partition of our country, thus seriously jeopardizing peace and security in Indochina and South-East Asia. Such a policy will only serve to impose an increased burden on the United States in terms of American casualties and war expenditures. It is suffering setbacks and is doomed to complete failure.

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South Viet Nam

12 UNITS AND 9 FIGHTERS CITED PLAF HEROES

BY a decree recently released by *Giai Phong* Press Agency, the PRG of the RSVN conferred on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of the Merging of the PLAF (Feb. 15, 1970) the "PLAF Hero" title on 12 outstanding units and 9 fighters, thus bringing to 22 units and 27 fighters the number of recipients of this distinction. On the list of honours were 7 units of the regular forces, one of regional troops and 4 of the guerilla and militia. A transport company and an engineering company were commended. Among the 9 fighters awarded, 3 received the title posthumously: 6 of the fighters were group, platoon and company commanders and the three others were higher ranking officers.

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⊙ **A Political Solution to the Lao Problem Put Forward by the Lao Patriotic Front**

⊙ *The Nixon Doctrine and Events in Laos*

Coconut-tree plantation at Giong Trom (Ben Tre province) devastated by American defoliants

U.S. DEFOLIATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM PARTAKES OF GENOCIDE

PRODUCTS termed as "defoliants" and weed-killers have been used by the Americans in high concentration in South Viet Nam over the past to years, and have wrought havoc among human beings, animals and plants, causing disastrous long-term effects on a nationwide scale. This chemical war has been conducted in disregard of all norms of morality and international convention.

ITS OBJECTIVES

WHEN in 1961 the Americans began using extensively "defoliants" for the first time in South Viet Nam, it did not produce much of a shock in the whole world. As Dr. Westing remarked at the press conference held by the International Information Centre for Denunciation of War Crimes in Paris on Dec. 19, 1969, when questions were asked on the use of herbicides, the answer had always been the same: these products are harmless chemicals used very often in agriculture and for long periods by the US, there was, therefore, nothing to worry about.

Moreover, US propaganda tended to make believe that the "defoliants" sprayed by US planes along the main routes or on forests close to key strategic areas would merely tear their thick foliage off the trees in order to deny the "VC" a natural cover favourable to ambushes.

But soon, the quantity of defoliants dumped increased rapidly, so did the areas exposed, to such an extent that they exceeded the production capacities of American industry. In its April 1967 issue *Businessweek* disclosed that the Army purchase of defoliants had largely surpassed production and that a shortage was to be anticipated soon.

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"Vietnamization" Means Not To End the War...

(Continued from page 1)

Questions 2 and 3:

Has there been any progress made in the plenary sessions which have already been held by the Paris Conference on Viet Nam? What are the future prospects for these talks... indefinite continuation? suspension? movement to another location?

Is there any way, in your opinion, that the Paris talks could be made more meaningful?

Answer:

The situation over the past year has shown that the Nixon Administration has no interest in negotiations, it uses talks only as a smoke-screen for continued aggressive war under the "Vietnamization" plan.

If the Paris talks are to be meaningful, the United States must renounce its aggressive position, bring the war to an end, withdraw completely and unconditionally from South Viet Nam all US and other foreign troops belonging to the US camp, and let the South Vietnamese people set up a broad provisional coalition government in a spirit of national concord, which is to hold free and democratic general elections in order to exercise their right of self determination, free from foreign interference. That is the correct path agreed up by the 10-point overall solution of the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. That is the correct path which guarantees the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements, and which is consistent with the true interests of the American people and the peace aspirations of the world's peoples.

Question 4:

On what terms would you find it possible for your Government to agree to a standstill ceasefire?

Answer:

As has been stated in the 10-point overall solution of the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, on the basis of its principles and content, the parties shall reach understanding to the effect of concluding agreements on the relevant questions with a view to bringing the war in South Viet Nam to an end, and contributing to restore peace in Viet Nam.

Question 5:

What political elements and circles in the South, apart from the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, would you be prepared to deal with in working out a settlement?

Answer:

In the 10-point overall solution, the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam have advocated the following:

"During the period intervening between the restoration of peace and the general elections, neither party shall impose its political regime on the people of South Viet Nam.

"The political forces representing the various social strata and political tendencies in South Viet Nam, that stand for peace, independence and neutrality, including those persons who, for political reasons, have to live abroad, will enter into talks to set up a provisional coalition government based on the principle of equality, democracy and mutual respect with a view to achieving a peaceful, independent, democratic and neutral South Viet Nam."

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam fully agrees with this reasonable and logical approach. We understand that the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, proceeding from the policy of national unity and national concord, are prepared to talk and cooperate with all persons in South Viet Nam who stand for peace, independence and neutrality, whatever their political past.

Question 6:

Has the Democratic of Viet Nam taken any measures that lead to de-escalate the fighting in the South?

Answer:

As the United States is committing aggression against Viet Nam, it is the Vietnamese people's right to fight against the aggressors in defence of their Fatherland. That is the right of self-defence of the Vietnamese nation. The Vietnamese people are resolved not to let anyone encroach upon this sacred right.

At present the Nixon Administration is obstinately continuing and intensifying the war in South Viet Nam. So long as there remains a single aggressor on our soil, our people, united as one man, are resolved to carry out President Ho Chi Minh's Testament and to fight on against US aggression for national salvation till total victory.

Question 7:

After a settlement, how do you envisage your relations with neighboring countries, notably, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand?

Answer:

Over the past several years, the United States has not only conducted a war of aggression in Viet Nam, but also carried out unceasing intervention and aggression in Laos with a deliberate attempt to turn Laos into a new-type colony and military base of the US. It has used the territory of Laos for the purposes of aggression in Viet Nam. Further, it has incessantly encroached upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and threatened her independence and neutrality. Betraying the interests of its country, the reactionary Kittikachorn clique has allowed the United States to use Thailand territory as a base for attacks against Viet Nam and Laos and acts of intimidation against the Kingdom of Cambodia; it has sent Thailand troops to fight as mercenaries for the US aggressors in South Viet Nam and Laos.

The peoples of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos have been fighting in ever greater unity against the aggressive policy of the United States and its agents to defend their fundamental national rights and peace in Asia and in the world.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has always carried out a good neighbour policy with regard to the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence; it has always correctly implemented the Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and Laos.

In their overall solution, the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam have advocated the following: "To carry out a policy of good neighbourly relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia on the basis of respect for her independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity within her present borders, to carry out a policy of good neighbourly relations with the Kingdom of Laos on the basis of respect for the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos."

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam pledges itself to join efforts with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam in striving to strengthen and develop the militant solidarity among the peoples of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam earnestly wishes that the Indochinese countries, in the present and in the future as well, will work together to promote lasting friendship and long-term cooperation, thereby contributing to strengthen peace in Indochina, Asia and in the world.

Question 8:

What is your view of the domestic situation in the United States and its impact on the fighting in Viet Nam?

Answer:

The war of aggression in Viet Nam has drained US treasure and lives, it has turned a lot of young Americans into odious murderers as was evidenced in the Son My and other cases, it has besmeared the honour of the United States.

Various strata of American people are demanding that the US authorities stop the war of aggression in Viet Nam, bring all US troops home, and not again be involved in any military adventure like Viet Nam. In American political circles, more and more people are coming to realize that the United States should pull out of the Viet Nam war to lessen the mounting difficulties that now confront it.

The Vietnamese people are thankful to the American progressives who, for their vital interests, and the ideals of peace and justice, have been valiantly opposing the US authorities' policy to prolong the criminal war in Viet Nam.

We clearly realize that whenever a country is facing aggression, it is mainly up to its people to unite and fight to drive the aggressors out of their land. That is the case with our people. At the same time, we highly appreciate the assistance given us by our brothers and friends around the world, as this assistance is very valuable for our resistance against US aggression, for national salvation.

57th Plenary Session of the Paris Conference on Viet Nam (March 5, 1970)

No Answer from US Delegation to Several DRVN Questions

SPEAKING on behalf of the DRVN Government delegation at the 57th session of the Paris Conference, Mr. Nguyen Minh Vy recalled the questions previously put by his delegation to the US Delegation. These were:

Concerning the withdrawal of US troops from South Viet Nam:

— When will the United States accept the principle of withdrawing US troops and those of other foreign countries in the US camp from South Viet Nam without laying down any conditions?

— Will the United States pull out all its forces, without exception for any services and arms?

— The United States should announce its time-limit and time-table for the complete withdrawal from South Viet Nam of US troops and those of other foreign countries in the US camp. Will the United States accept the six-month period proposed by Minister Nguyen Thi Binh?

Concerning a political settlement in South Viet Nam:

— The US claims to respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. When will the United States put an end to its intervention in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam? When will the United States drop the corrupt and unpopular Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration which the United States has set up and imposed on the South Vietnamese people?

— When will the United States agree to the formation of a provisional coalition government so that this government may organize free and democratic general elections in South Viet Nam?

The DRVN Delegation's spokesman said: "Until now the US delegate has not seriously replied to these questions of principle. This can only prove that the Nixon administration does not want to peacefully settle the Viet Nam problem on the basis of respect for the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and the right to self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. Meanwhile it has been striving its utmost to carry out stepping up raiding sweeps in South Viet Nam, and also escalating the war in Laos, thus supplying another proof of its intention to prolong the war in Viet Nam."

Mr. Nguyen Minh Vy urged the US delegation to provide seriousness answers to the questions put to them so as to promptly arrive at an agreement to end the war.

STORY OF A FARMING CO-OPERATIVE

What progress has agriculture in North Viet Nam made up to 1970, ten years after the launching of the agricultural co-operative movement and after four years of war? This question, in essence, boils down to this: where is the present level of the agricultural co-ops. The following investigation conducted by our correspondents Pham Cuong and Vu Quy Vy at one of those co-ops will give our readers a clear picture.

A CO-OP LIKE MANY OTHERS

WHY did we pick out Ngo Xuyen for our investigation?

Because that village, first of all, lies in the former province of Hung Yen *. For the shortage of its cultivable land, the scale and frequence of the natural calamities, Hung Yen is typical of the provinces in the Red River delta. Until 1954, its only trade was rice growing. It was the traditional land of famine.

Ngo Xuyen is just a miniature of the province.

The village agricultural co-op possesses 82 hectares of arable land. If we do not take into account the 5.8 hectares given to the family economy of the farmers, there remain only 76.2 hectares for collective farming. By dint of big efforts, the co-op has succeeded in growing two rice crops per year on 45.3 hectares. The remaining land, about 40 hectares, yield one rice crop and one subsidiary crop per year. The co-op accountant reported that in the past few years, the annual average of crops rotation had risen to 2.2, bringing the total of cultivated area in 1969 to 167.6 hectares.

The co-op comprises 238 peasant households (1968) with 1,103 "mouths to feed." The working population counts 392 people: 316 "main workhands" and 77 "auxiliary labourers." Women make up two-thirds of the labour force.

The average acreage per head of population is 743 square metres.

The cattle count 42 buffaloes and oxen or cows of which 36 are used in farm work. There is no tractor and each of these draught animals has to do the ploughing and harrowing of 4.6 hectares of fields. A collective pigsty with 18 compartments has been set up where a 3-person team is in charge of the rearing of 73 pigs (1969) chiefly to supply piglets for livestock-breeding in the families.

Near the pigsty is a large pond which is a haven of freshness in the village. Six farmers are assigned to rear fish in this pond. In the co-op, a total of 2.5 hectares are set aside for this purpose. Wide paths border the pond with rows of coconut trees, eucalyptus and casuarina trees planted three or four years ago. This, the co-op manager told us, will be the cultural centre of the village. The school and the club will be moved there and the children and old folks will gather there late in the afternoons or on moonlit nights.

Over there are the rice and potato fields and farther away looms the outline of an irrigation canal.

Apart from the farm tools that the peasants have in adequate number, the co-op bought a diesel motor in 1957. It is operating a rice-husking machine (345 tons of paddy per year) and two rudimentary threshers. A smithy has just been open to make and repair small hand-tools.

The labour force is divided into five brigades each having a hamlet as centre of action. We noticed that there was for each brigade some paved floor for drying grains and some storages and compost sheds.

The co-op has 62,810 *dong* in cash.

That is all its "material and technical basis": very little land, cattle and fund and almost no up-to-date implement.

Here is another reason for our choice of Ngo Xuyen as object of our investigation.

It does not rank among those vanguard co-ops which have made headlines in the press of our country for having sometimes made real leaps forward in production and the output of their crops. In a stricter sense, we chose Ngo Xuyen because we thought the results it has obtained would allow us to judge, without fear of erring, those achieved by other average co-operatives in the DRVN. Now, let us follow the story of Ngo Xuyen since its founding.

FROM THE FAMILY PLOT TO COLLECTIVE FARMING

THE agricultural co-operative movement began in late 1968.

The circumstances were favourable. The land reform undertaken in the wake of the liberation of North Viet Nam made the centuries old dream of the peasants come true: possession of a plot of land. However, the share allotted to each was very small, the average acreage per head of population in the DRVN being, as everyone knows, only one tenth of hectare. Each family received half an hectare at most.

The peasant applied himself to working his small plot. He naturally earned therefrom more than before but the crop as well as the family income remained always meagre.

How to tide it over if a drought or typhoon occurred, or if he fell seriously ill? He would invariably be obliged to borrow and get indebted or to sell his land. Meanwhile, farm work remained very strenuous. In case of drought, it would be a backbreaking job to empty, scoop by scoop, water from the ponds to his riceplot. When it rained, he would have to gain every minute when his plot was still full of water to plough and harrow it. However, his turn to use the buffalo had not come because one buffalo indivisibly belonged to several families. Then, he had not enough money to buy new farm tools, even rudimentary ones. In short, the land reform brought land and human dignity. Still it was not the magic wand to break the vicious circle of poverty. This the peasants in Ngo Xuyen learnt from experience.

To these farmers who were quite happy to have a plot of land of their own but still anxious about their future, the Party put the question: whether to continue individual farming or join hands to proceed to socialism? The peasant was particularly receptive to this. Moreover, he had complete confidence in the Party. It was under the Party's leadership that he had chased the colonialists, the mandarins and the landlords and had acquired land. The Party members who carried out this policy were no strangers to him. They were cadres that he had sheltered and fed during the Resistance, and even peasants in the village itself. Many of the peasants had been for years guerillas or in the army, which accounted for their high political awareness and organisational capacity, their class consciousness which gave a more concrete substance to the traditions of solidarity in the Vietnamese villages. Mutual-aid teams which were set up following the land reform and operated regularly demonstrated to all the benefits of collective work.

The Party launched a vast campaign of agitation and propaganda. Discussions were held in the whole village. Very heated debates dealt with the question of which way to take: the capitalist development or socialism? Capitalism or socialism were no longer distant and nebulous abstractions but had become vital issues. After each meeting, discussions were carried on late into the night in each family. Never before had the people in Ngo Xuyen thought so much and raised so many problems for discussion. Without being able to express it clearly, each felt deeply that individual farming on small plots of land could not take him a long way. Co-operation, socialism were still for them, to be sure, imponderables but they at least were pregnant with promises. Aspiration for socialism finally got the upper hand over attachment to the family plot of land.

The first co-operative was set up in late 1958 and early 1959 on an experimental basis. It embraced the territory of hamlet Gao. 18 households two of which included Party members filed application for membership. They pooled together fields, cattle and farm tools while remaining owners of their plots they brought to the co-op for which they received a certain rent amounting to 25% of the crops. They also kept for themselves 5% of the land, a garden or a pond (if any) to start their family economy.

The example was followed. In 1959 a second co-op gathered the peasant households in hamlet Dinh and Doai. Early 1960, hamlet Buom joined them. Meanwhile, the last hamlet of the village built a third co-op for itself.

In late 1961, all these small co-ops merged into a single one involving the whole village. This merger caused not a few complications.

The area of land and the funds put in common varied from one hamlet to another. Members of one co-operative thought they were in a disadvantageous position in relation to the others.

The management of the new co-operative met with multiple difficulties. The cadres had had no experience in running a co-operative that size. Many co-op members there still lacked a new mentality, the sense of responsibility before common property. They usually remained passive when people worked out the production plan of the co-op and decided on the tasks. Some even left farm tools in the field after work. What is more, the village had a long-standing tradition of longan growing which every summer brought in a substantial income. When the longans ripened, even the heads of production brigades gave up their work in the co-op. A canal had to be dug across a field. The owner of the field, an old woman, threw herself on the ground and lamented: "Heavens, this field I have received in the land reform. And now you are taking it from me!"

By the end of 1962, the managing committee received a lot of applications to leave the co-op.

The provincial committee of the Party sent a delegate to the place to give additional explanations and

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

In the ricefields of Tan Duyen agricultural co-operative, Ha Bac province

* *Hung Yen has now been merged with Hai Duong to form Hai Hung province.*

U.S. DEFOLIATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM PARTAKES OF GENOCIDE

(*Continued from page 1*)

However, defoliation had not given the expected military results. Roger Hilsman, former State Department Intelligence Chief (quoted by Seymour Hersh in *CBW in Viet Nam*) noted after an on-the-spot inspection, that "The leaves were gone, but the branches and trunks remained. Even if they had not, it was not leaves and trunks that guerillas used for cover, but the curves in the road and the hills and valleys..." This did not prevent the continued large-scale use of defoliants. From 560 ha in 1961 and 11,030 ha in 1962, the target areas reached 089,300 ha in 1968. So, far from diminishing, the quantity of defoliants has risen, in spite of the failure of the operation in the military field. Why?

It is because the operation effectively aims at another goal: to deprive the people, who are supposed to feed the "VC", of food by systematically destroying crops, vegetation and cattle. It is the weapon of famine that hits the population as a whole. To avoid starvation, the Resistance fighters are expected to lay down their arms and the population to go over to the "government" forces. Therefore, defoliation clearly partakes of genocide. It has been carried out by the very men who rain bombs on villages with B.52's.

MOST DANGEROUS BIOLOGICAL WEAPON

OF all the weapons used to "burn all, destroy all, kill all", defoliation proves to be most rewarding: it can work on a vast area and at the same time requires little man-power. The *New York Times* quoted on Sept. 21, 1966 a Pentagon official as saying, "What's the difference between denying the Vietcong rice by destroying it from air or by sending in large numbers of ground forces to prevent the enemy from getting it? The end result's the same, only the first method takes far less men."

The effect of defoliants on crops is striking. Used in high doses and at an accelerated tempo as they are in South Viet Nam, these agents, in most cases, simply kill all vegetation.

In principle, the sprays are reserved for the VC zones, but in practice as the VC operates in all areas and every Vietnamese potentially is a VC, chemical agents are thus dumped on all South Viet Nam provinces, from the Mekong Delta to the mountain areas, from the edges of Saigon to the Cambodian borders. Every time a scandal erupts, American official reports speak of "mistakes." "Mistakes" that hit entire areas! American Professor Pfeiffer, returning from a trip to South Viet Nam in March 1969, predicted the disappearance of several species of wood and birds from the Vietnamese jungle. According to him, South Viet Nam's rubber industry is being threatened seriously. Domestic animals and poultry are also hard hit. According to an investigation by the NFL, in the pigs, temperature goes up, breathing becomes difficult, the body swells, the belly balloons out and death follows. Hens and ducks are killed or become sterile. Fish dies in streams, lakes and ponds.

Banana-trees at Giong Trom (Ben Tre province) damaged by US chemicals

GENETIC EFFECTS

THE effect on human beings is really dramatic. Exposed directly to chemical agents, man suffers from vomiting, difficult breathing, headache, and irritations of the skin and eyes. A recent statement of the South Viet Nam Commission for Denunciation of the Imperialists' Crimes listed 905,780 ha subjected to spraying and 285,740 people affected during the first 10 months under Nixon.

Unquestionably, the teratogenous effect is one of the most dramatic effects. Reports from Saigon disclose the tragically high rate of deformed babies. According to the Saigon paper *Tia Sang* of June 20, 1969, Dr. Pham Tu Chinh, director of Hung Vuong hospital, had declared that "between the beginning of January and June 20, 1969, 49 cases of birth of non-developed foetus were recorded." Dr Arthur Galston, Professor at Yale University, said that animals to whom herbicides are administered have engendered monstrosities. According to the experiments conducted by Prof. Pfeiffer, rats which have absorbed 2, 4, 5-T in the period of pregnancy have littered little rats with cleft palates or deformed eyes.

DISASTROUS LONG-TERM EFFECTS

HOWEVER the harm does not limit to these immediate effects. Long-term and catastrophic damage on a nationwide scale can be forecast. Of late, American scientists, alarmed by the wanton use of defoliants and weedkillers in South Viet Nam, have undertaken on-the-spot investigations to determine the extent of long-term damage. The studies have been made difficult by the fighting. Yet, summary and limited inquiries can also give an idea of the damage. All American scientists are unanimous to acknowledge that serious ecologic changes are possible. Used in high concentration, defoliants and weedkillers have destroyed a great part of the Vietnamese jungle where tall trees and shrubs have been killed, and several species of vegetation and animals exterminated. Several species of birds which usually people the jungle have been killed because the insects and fruit they used to live on have been destroyed. By eliminating the natural cover of the soil, defoliation **facilitates erosion and leads to lateritisation** which renders once fertile vast areas barren. American news agencies reported that for the establishment of the "MacNamara" barrier, the Americans had used particularly active chemical agents (chlorophenyl dimethylurea and dichlorophenyl dimethylurea) which **render the soil infertile for decades.**

Everybody knows the apprehensions of American biologists as to the long-term effects of herbicides used, however, with all necessary precautions. What will be the aftermaths of this massive chemical war on the fauna, flora and crops for Viet Nam's future generations?

STILL A PROBLEM IN QUESTION

AS we see, under the euphemisms of "defoliants" and "weedkillers" the Americans are waging in South Viet Nam a large-scale chemical war no one at present can estimate in full the damage it has been doing. No wonder we are daily witnessing an ever growing movement of protest against this illegal and barbarous war. Most recently, the well-known American Association for the Advancement of Science has formed an organisation to investigate the effects of "defoliants" in South Viet Nam, and a petition had been lodged with the Pentagon urging that the use of chemical weapons be ended. Driven to the wall, Nixon has opted to take an "initiative towards peace" by declaring on Nov. 25, 1969 that the US decided not to be the first to use toxic chemical weapons and renounced biological warfare. He also asked the Senate to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. In fact, the Geneva Protocol signed on July 17, 1925 by the US representative and adhered to by some 80 countries, has never been ratified by the US. Nevertheless, in asking the Senate to endorse it, Nixon made it clear that this did not rule out the use of defoliants and weedkillers — 2, 4-D and 2, 4,5-T — as well as the CN, CS and DM gases, these substances, of course, continuing to be used in South Viet Nam. Not any change will thus be brought to the chemical war he is making against the Vietnamese people.

This chemical war in South Viet Nam, in all its acuteness, still remains a case of conscience for mankind.

EVIDENCE ON EFFECTS OF US CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTH VIET NAM

STEPPED-UP CHEMICAL SPRAYINGS IN SOUTH VIET NAM

Years	*Areas exposed (in hectares)*
1961 *(from August to end December)*	560
1962	11,030
1963	320,000
1964	500,000
1965	700,000
1966	876,490
1967	903,320
1968	989,300

(Figures supplied by the NFL)

TO damage or kill a plant may appear so small a thing in comparison to the human slaughter every war entails as to be deserving of little concern. But when we intervene in the ecology of a region on a massive scale, we may set in motion an irreversible chain of events which could continue to affect both the agriculture and the wildlife of the area—and therefore the people, also—long after the war is over.

Arthur W. Galston, Professor of Biology at Yale University, in *Herbicides in Viet Nam—Scientist and Citizen*, Aug.-Sept. 1967.

CHARLES E. SMITH, Saigon correspondent for *UPI*, wrote on March 16, 1963, that defoliants and herbicides "are used in certain places in the central highlands where the Viet Cong terrorists grow crop. In such cases the aim is to eliminate sources of food."

Seymour M. Hersh, in *Chemical and Biological Warfare.*

IN essence, this aim (the defoliation plan-*Ed.*) is similar to that of every food blockade (such as the one imposed against the Central Powers in World War I). As a nutritionist who has seen famines on three continents, one of them Asia, and as a physician with a basic interest in preventive medicine, we can say flatly that there has never been a famine or a food shortage—whatever might have been its cause—which has not first and overwhelmingly affected the small children.

Dr. **Jean Mayer** and Dr. **Victor W.Sidel**, two Harvard Physicians, in June 29, 1966 *Christian Century.*

IN Viet Nam there is something more serious than "defoliation" because the chemical products which may strip trees of leaves without harming the plants nor disrupting the vegetable cycle are still being experimented. This word is therefore not used to mean operations during which tons of herbicides and arboricides are sprayed on forests and food crops. "Defoliation" is a euphemism to designate destruction of vegetation. Though the U.N. Political Commission did not deem it necessary to condemn the US, the utilization of chemical weapons may give rise to unexpected biological reactions in the near future.

Prof. **Minskowki**, Report to the Bertrand Russell International Tribunal, 2nd Session, Roskilde (Denmark) — Nov. 22, 1967.
(Retranslated from the French)

THE same 2,4-D and 2,4, 5-T which are being used extensively as tree defoliants may be used, with some-what different stronger formulation, for the purpose of killing or rendering unproductive various food crops, including rice. Unless carefully controlled both as to area and as to concentrations sprayed, the jungle defoliation aspect of the herbicide program in Viet Nam can kill crops in areas where such an outcome is *not* intended.

Arthur W. Galston, Professor of Biology at Yale University, in *Herbicides in Viet Nam - Scientist and Citizen*, Aug.-Sept. 1967.

I would like to summarize the three aspects of the defoliation mentioned by Dr. Pfeiffer. First, it is most probable that we are destroying a very important part of the ecology of that country. Second, we are using in fact chemical weapons because these two products are banned in the US for health reasons. It is therefore chemical warfare.

Dr. **Westing**, Press Conference organized by the International Centre for Denunciation of War Crimes—Palais d'Orsay, Paris, Dec. 19, 1969.
(Retranslated from the French)

Do not contaminate irrigation ditches or water used for domestic purposes.

Caution. May cause skin irritation. Avoid contact with eyes, skin and clothing. Keep out of reach of children. Causes irritation of skin and eyes .. In case of contact, flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes and get medical attention; wash skin with soap and plenty of water. Remove and wash contaminated clothing before re-use. Do not wear contaminated shoes.

Labels on **Dow** products (2,4-D and 2,4, 5-T).

IN summary, we are too ignorant of the interplay of forces in ecological problems to know how far-reaching and how lasting will be the changes in ecology brought about by the widespread spraying of herbicides in Viet Nam. These changes may include immediate harm to people in the sprayed areas and may extend to serious and lasting damage to soil and agriculture, rendering more difficult South Viet Nam's recovery from war, regardless of who is the "victor."

Arthur W. Galston, Professor of Biology at Yale University, in *Scientist and Citizen* — August-September, 1967.

I would like to tell you not only of the immediate effects of these herbicides but also of their ecologic aftermaths. I would deal first with some of the products which apparently have quite harmless names. The first is called orange and is made up 50 per cent of 2,4-D and 50 per cent of 2,4,5-T. These are synthetic hormones of plants which cause the fall of leaves and, in great doses, the death of many species. In fact, the US air force uses these products in doses ten times stronger than in normal use in agriculture in the US. I would like now to speak of a recent scientific investigation made on that orange product already mentioned (50 per cent of 2,4-D and 50 per cent of 2,4,5-T). For those among you who are chemists, I simply point out that 2,4-D is dichloro-phenoxyacetic acid. Thus this institute has prepared a report on the teratogenic effects of that product on mice in laboratories. It has closely examined them. When I say teratogenic effects, I mean that it brings about monstrosities of laboratory foetuses and leads to a very high percentage of foetal death.

Following studies carried out by the Cancer National Institute on this product, its utilization is largely forbidden in the US and it will soon be withdrawn from the market. To the question whether the use of this product which causes deformities would be stopped in Viet Nam, the US Ministry of Defence said that no change in the present policy was contemplated and that it would continue to be employed there. Prominent biologists in the US reckon on the basis of the doses already used in Viet Nam that it is perfectly possible that a pregnant Vietnamese woman may absorb doses comparable to those which have engender malformations in experimental mice. The Saigon papers have reported many births of deformed babies.

The second product extensively employed is the white agent. It is used in the same manner as the former, that is for defoliation purpose, to increase visibility. It is made up of 2,4-D and derived from pychlorinic acid; it is manufactured by the Dow Chemical Company for use there with full knowledge that it has the same noxious effects. The white product is thus banned in most cases in the US because its utilization has an extremely persistent action. The studies conducted by the Agricultural Ministry have shown that some crops cannot grow there years after the product has been sprayed. I must say that I anxiously learnt that this product used in the periphery of Saigon has rendered the soil barren for many months, even many years. Another agent called blue agent is used to devastate ricefields. It is an arsenious compound very rarely used in the US. I have seen labels on containers of this product warning that children must keep clear of it and any contact with the skin must be avoided. However it is largely employed, as said above, to destroy ricecrops.

Dr. **Pfeiffer**, Professor of Zoology, Monstana University, in Press conference organized by the International Centre for Denunciation of War Crimes, Palais d'Orsay, Paris, Dec. 19, 1969.
(Retranslated from the French)

ARMY GAS COULD COVER SOUTH VIET NAM

THE army has bought enough CS gas for South-East Asia since 1964 to cover every square mile on South Viet Nam and then some, according to a leading biologist's analysis of the Pentagon's own figures.

And the army is buying 16 times more CS — a toxic chemical which acts like tear gas — in 1969 than it did in 1964 when the Viet Nam war build-up began.

Dr. Mathew S. Meselson, professor of biology at Harvard and a consultant to the United States arms control agency, contends the widespread use of CS in Viet Nam puts in it the category of a chemical weapon rather than a riot control agent.

(*Continued page 9*)

The "Vietnamization" Program: WHAT AMERICANS THINK OF IT

Mr Nixon and His "Vietnamization" Plan under Mounting Fire

FROM almost every quarter last week, the nine-month-old administration of Richard Nixon was under sustained and angry fire and increasingly the target of the attacks was Mr. Nixon himself and his conduct of the Presidency. His Vietnamization policy was the object of ever more vehement criticism from Republicans and Democrats alike — and his ever harsher rejoinders awakened echoes of Lyndon Johnson at low political ebb.

Newsweek, Oct. 13, 1969

"Vietnamization": a Public Hoax!

SENATOR **Georges McGovern** said Wednesday President Nixon's program for gradual US withdrawal from Viet Nam was a "public hoax anticipating a 300,000-man US force in South-East Asia for 15 or more years." The policy of Vietnamization," McGovern said, "is a political hoax designed to screen from the American people the bankruptcy of our needless military involvement in the affairs of the Vietnamese people. How can we justify before God and man the use of our massive fire-power to continue a slaughter that serves neither our interest nor the interest of the Vietnamese?"

UPI, Feb. 4, 1970

Real Official Strategy Is To Appease American Dissent

THIS must be just about the first time in the history of warfare that a nation has thought it could prevail by withdrawing combat troops and reducing its military presence...

Our strategy is not to buy concessions from Hanoi with our military withdrawals, but to buy patience and endurance from the American people for an indefinitely long American occupation in South Viet Nam. This is the real, though unexplained and unavowed, official strategy and it makes far more sense than the professed strategy of reducing our military power to impose our political aims. The real strategy is to appease American dissent by removing many of the burdens of the war—by amending the draft so that primarily 19-year-olds are vulnerable, by changing the tactics of the battlefield to reduce the casualties, by withdrawing most of the combat infantry. The theory of the strategy is that a long occupation using some 200,000 support troops and the artillery and the Air Force, can be made acceptable to the American people. The official strategy is addressed not to negotiating with our adversaries but to placating American opinion.

The crucial decision about ending the war has not in fact been taken... No one can negotiate as long as there has not been an American decision to leave entirely.

Walter Lippmann
(*Newsweek*, December 1, 1969)

The US To Be Kept Bogged Down in Viet Nam

NO one knows how long it (Vietnamization plan) will take, what residual US support force will be needed and for how long, and there is no certainty the South Vietnamese army ever can take over the fighting.

W. Fulbright
Jan. 19, 1970

SOME 750 casualties are being inflicted on our troops each week, and war is draining 70 million US dollars a day out of the tax payer's pocket...A final end to the war does not seem to be any closer than it was a year ago... Indeed my fear is that the current policy will keep the US bogged down in Viet Nam with the killing and war cost continuing indefinitely.

W. Fulbright
(reported by *UPI*, Jan. 31, 1970)

A Policy To Continue the War

HARRIMAN called President Nixon's plan for Vietnamization "a policy to continue the war" in that South-East Asia country.

"Nixon is engaged in imposing President Thieu on the Vietnamese people" Harriman said, adding Nixon has given Thieu "a veto on American foreign policy."

Harriman accused Nixon of downgrading the Paris peace talks by not appointing a high-level negotiator to replace Henry Cabot Lodge.

AP, Feb. 19, 1970

No US Interest in Viet Nam Justifies the Sacrifice

"WE have not Vietnamized the war," [Republican Senator] **Goodell** said in prepared testimony. "We have cosmetized it" (made it look good), adding that "while Vietnamization is a great public relations success, the real war — the war going on there, in Viet Nam — has not been defused. The Administration has merely adopted a combat reduction strategy, aiming at cutting back American casualties to a level where a continued US presence in Viet Nam would be acceptable to American public opinion.

"The price of present policies will be anywhere from 5,000 to 20,000 American dead in the next three years. Anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000 American wounded... Anywhere from 40 billion and 60 billion US dollars... No US interest in Viet Nam justifies the sacrifice. These are the costs of present policies, if anything goes according to plan. If it does not the price will be more staggering still."

UPI, Feb. 3, 1970

More American Boys To Die for a Corrupt, Inept and Unrepresentative Regime?

SENATOR **Thomas F. Eagleton**, Democrat, Missouri, said that until there is a government which can command broad popular support, South Viet Nam will be incapable either of negotiating a peace at Paris or winning a peace through Vietnamization.

"To send additional thousands of American boys to their deaths and thousands more to be maimed in the cause of protecting the present regime is unconscionable." Eagleton said adding that [he] "calls for a Vietnamization of the South Vietnamese government to give Vietnamization of the war a chance to succeed."

AP, Feb. 3, 1970

SENATOR **Clairborne Pell**, Democrat, Rhode Island, said asylum for the corrupt, inept and unrepresentative government in Saigon was necessary.

UPI, Feb. 4, 1970

Senator Apprehensive about the Way the National Euphoria over Viet Nam Was Created

SENATOR **Harold E. Hughes** charged that the Nixon administration's "Vietnamization policy" will not get us out of Viet Nam. Rather it will perpetuate our involvement.

(*Continued page 9*)

A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR THE LAO PROBLEM

— Excerpts from the March 6, 1970 Statement of the Lao Patriotic Front Central Committee —

THE position of the Lao Patriotic Front is: the peaceful settlement of the Lao problem must be based on the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos and on the actual situation in Laos.

In more concrete terms:

1. All countries respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, as provided for in the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. The United States must put an end to its intervention and aggression in Laos; stop escalating the war, completely cease the bombing of the Lao territory; withdraw from Laos all US advisers and military personnel as well as all US weapons and war material; stop using military bases in Thailand and Thailand mercenaries for purposes of aggression against Laos. It must stop using Lao territory for intervention and aggression against other countries.

2. In accordance with the 1962 Geneva Agreements, the Kingdom of Laos refrains from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, and from allowing foreign countries to establish military bases in Laos, and to introduce troops and military personnel into its territory.

The Kingdom of Laos follows a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, establishes relations with other countries in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and accepts aid with no political conditions attached from all countries. With the other Indochinese countries, it establishes friendly and good-neighbour relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and of the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. With regard to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Republic of South Viet Nam, it respects Viet Nam's independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. With regard to the Kingdom of Cambodia, it respects the latter's independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity within its present borders.

3. To respect the Throne; to hold free and democratic general elections, to elect a National Assembly and to set up a democratic government of national union truly representative of the Lao people of all nationalities, to build a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, unified, and prosperous Laos.

4. During the period from the restoration of peace to the general elections for setting up the National Assembly, the parties concerned shall, in a spirit of national concord, equality and mutual respect, hold a consultative political conference composed of representatives of all Lao parties concerned in order to deal with all the affairs of Laos, and set up a Provisional Coalition Government. The parties shall reach agreement on the establishment of a security zone to ensure the normal functioning of the Consultative Political Conference and the Provisional Coalition Government, free from all attempts at sabotage or pressure by forces from inside or outside Laos.

5. The unification of Laos shall be achieved through consultations between the Lao parties on the principle of equality and national concord. Pending this unification, no party shall use force to encroach upon or nibble at the areas controlled by another. The pro-American forces must withdraw forthwith from the areas they have illegally occupied, and resettle in their native places those people who have been forcibly removed from there, at the same time, they must pay compensations for damages caused to them. Each Party pledges itself to refrain from discrimination and reprisals against those who have collaborated with another party.

THE above-mentioned position of the Lao Patriotic Front for the settlement of the Lao problem meet the Lao people's earnest aspirations and is consistent with the interests of peace and security in Indochina, South-East Asia and the world. It is the just basis of a solution to the Lao problem.

The Lao problem must be settled among the Lao parties concerned. To create conditions for the Lao parties concerned to meet, the United States must, as an immediate step, stop escalating the war, and stop completely the bombing of Lao territory without posing any condition.

THE PLAIN OF JARS BATTLE

Area liberated by the Lao People's Liberation Armed Forces from Feb. 10 to Feb. 24, 1970

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND EVENTS IN LAOS

OPERATION *Kou Kiet* (Save Honour) whose name shows the Lao right-wing's intention to take vengeance for the reverses it had sustained earlier has now ended in failure. It was also a significant setback for its masters—the US imperialists.

Fifty battalions of Lao mercenaries — constituted mainly by Vang Pao's "Special Forces"—and 5,000 troops from Thailand, all placed under the direct command of US officers and receiving USAF logistical and fire-power support, had to evacuate helter-skelter the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khuang area located in the free zone of Laos and illegally occupied since October last by the reactionary forces. The system of defence posts carefully set up since that date and the big amount of occupation troops garrisoned there could not resist the sweeping assaults of Lao patriots. Neither was the massive intervention by B.52s since Feb. 17 able to check the advance of the latter. According to incomplete figures released by the Lao Patriotic Front, from the night of Feb. 10 to Feb. 24, 1970, the Lao patriotic armed forces heavily trounced 5 enemy battalions, killed or wounded over 1,000 enemy troops, disbanded over 1,000 others, shot down or destroyed 28 aircraft, wrecked dozens of military vehicles, captured hundreds of weapons.

The big stir caused in US public opinion by the events in Laos is accounted for by the stakes involved in the fighting: the US setback in Laos constituted a writing on the wall for the "Vietnamization" of the war in South Viet Nam. "Puppet troops + US fire-power and air force": such a formula was intensively applied in Laos.

The policy pursued in Laos since 1954 has been typical of US behaviour in Asia. Every year, into this country of 3 million people are poured hundreds of millions of dollars. American "aid" literally submerges Laos. The dollars are used to keep a phlethoric army and a swarm of political clients. The CIA and "Green Berets" train Vang Pao's forces; from neighbouring Thailand, take off the planes that by day and by night bomb the free zones, and mercenaries sent to the rescue of Lao reactionaries. The evolution of Laos' situation has also been enlightening, considering the repeated failures of US policy. The US has proved powerless to undermine the political influence of patriotic forces and to nibble off any small portion of the free zones. The carefully-prepared 1969 counter-offensive, taking the "special war" to its highest level, was mounted by the Americans in the hope of achieving a decisive victory.

On the other hand, what happened in Laos gave the lie to the Nixon statements that the United States would endeavour from now to limit its involvement in foreign countries. Indeed in Laos there was a dangerous military "escalation" about which Senator Mike Mansfield voiced his concern. That B.52s made their appearance in Laos was a dramatic provocation, but there were other things too. The US war in

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STORY OF A FARMING CO-OPERATIVE

(Continued from page 5)

redress the errors committed. With regard to the cadres, they were asked to strictly observe the three principles of the agricultural co-operation: "Voluntary joining, mutual benefits and democratic management." Three recalcitrant Party members were disciplined. As for the peasants, they were educated in the collective spirit, they were made to realize that the common interest, considered in the long run, coincided with the personal interest. This watchword was adopted: "The co-op is our family and the members are its masters."

Besides, throughout Hung Yen province, the talk was about the building and expansion of hydraulic works on which people pinned big hopes. The fever caught hold of the Ngo Xuyen population, too. They had to take advantage of the dry season to begin immediately the work which, clearly enough, must be collective. Hope and unity came back and the peasants withdrew their applications to quit the co-op.

When 1963 began, the co-operation movement could be said to have been put back on its feet. The Party launched throughout the country a widespread campaign for "improvement of the management of the co-ops, renovation of techniques, aimed at the development of a multi-cultural, strong and steady agriculture." The drive was to have two stages and spread over many years. The responsible cadres carefully studied the statutes and directives for application, learned the rules of management and book-keeping. With the help of a provincial cadre, they laid down the direction for production in their village. What crops: rice, sweet potato, potato, vegetables, to be grown in such and such a kind of field? Which was the best soil for such and such a crop? Where to get fertilizers? Should the ploughs be changed?

But there were not only technical problems.

How to remunerate a member who has ploughed, another who reaped, and a third who carried compost or built a field boundary? There were dozens of different jobs which were to be paid on different levels. There had been, indeed, norms defined by the provincial services, but still these had to be adjusted to the local conditions.

Then, not the responsible cadres alone had to grasp firmly all these new notions but still these had to be accepted by all the co-op members who were urged to suggest necessary modifications.

More meetings and more discussions. The enthusiasm of the first days returned together with the unity. A new step had been made. The cadres made visible progress in management and leadership. Late 1965, while American bombs were falling the members refused to take the rent which were their due for their contribution in land, cattle, etc. From now on, remuneration was given solely on the basis of the amount of work done. Ngo Xuyen became a co-operative of a high level, a socialist co-operative.

(To be continued)

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND EVENTS IN LAOS

(Continued from page 8)

Laos termed by many observers a "fartive" one has now become transparent, and it is not surprising that broad segments of US opinion are demanding that the Nixon administration let the nation know the exact scale of US involvement in Laos.

It is obvious that the Washington rulers cannot hide everything from the American people. Melvin Laird had to acknowledge that US planes carried out massive bombings in the Plain of Jars area, but these were only intended to interdict the route to South Viet Nam, he said. The Defence Secretary seemed to lack the slightest notion of geography.

Anyhow the White House and the Pentagon have no right to interfere so grossly in the affairs of Laos. Senator A. Gore rightly remarked that the United States had been violating the 1962 Geneva Accords.

As the March 6, 1970 statement of the Lao Patriotic Front CC rightly points out, the Lao problem must be settled among the Lao parties concerned. To create conditions for the Lao parties concerned to meet, the United States must, as an immediate step, stop escalating the war and stop completely the bombing of Lao territory without posing any condition.

U.S. Defoliation in South Viet Nam...

(Continued from page 7)

He argues further that the United States government in disarmament conferences in the 1930s agree such chemical agents should not be used in warfare — only to control civilian rioting.

Meselson, relying on figures in an army field manual, said the CS-1 and CS-2 bought for South-East Asia so far in the war could cover 80,000 square miles if dispersed by helicopter. The area of [South] Viet Nam is about 66,000 square miles.

All told, the army said it has bought 13,736,000 pounds of CS, CS-1 and CS-2 between fiscal 1964 and 1969 for South-East Asia. The purchases leaped from 367,000 pounds in fiscal 1964 to 6,063,000 pounds in fiscal 1969.

CS is short for the compound O-Chlorobenzalmalononitrile. It comes in powder form, evaporing into a highly irritating gas. CS-1 and CS-2 are ground more finely than regular CS so they can cover a wide area when dropped by planes and helicopters.

CS-2 is treated with water resistant silicome. This allows the toxic chemical to remain active long after it has fallen on the ground. People walking through it kick up clouds of the gas.

Montreal Star — July 24, 1969

The "Vietnamization" Program: *What Americans Think of It*

(Continued from page 7)

Hughes said he was "profoundly apprehensive about the national euphoria over Viet Nam" and "about the way it was created." "First you pistolwhip the mass media and then you commandeer it for political purposes," he said adding "when we accept this we have gone a long way to ward surrendering one of our most basic freedoms — the freedom of expression."

Hughes said that "it is my conviction that our aim should be to end the war, not simply to reduce the casualties and the troops commitment and at the same time perpetuate the military occupation."

AP, Feb. 3, 1970

SENATOR **Frank Church**, Democrat, Idaho, said, "the people of the US have been lulled into a sense of confidence that the policy would work."

AP, Feb. 3, 1970

A Gloomy Report

DESPITE optimistic reports issued daily by officials here (Washington) and in Saigon, the Viet Nam war "appears to be not only far from being won but far from been over," according to a special staff study released today by the Senate Foreign Committee.

Written by two former State Department officers, the skeptical report examines progress of the Vietnamization and pacification programs, plus political stability in Saigon and arrives at a general gloomy conclusion.

Progress is at best uncertain, while US policy seems to be based "on far more ambiguous, confusing and contradictory evidence" than most senior US officials will admit. The report seriously questions whether the Nixon program of gradually turning over combat duties to Saigon's army, while Americans systematically withdraw, can work. It suggests communist forces have enough strength to launch major attacks in the near future, forcing US withdrawals to be halved or reversed, or requiring pullouts to continue even though (adverse) units are on the offensive. The latter case, the staff report says, "would be interpreted at home and probably abroad, as a military and political defeat."

The study was written for the committee chairman, Senator Fulbright, by staff consultants **James G. Lowenstein** and **Richard M. Moose**, who have visited South Viet Nam several times.

A recurring theme of their study is that acknowledged progress in South Viet Nam is far more fragile than American officials want to concede. They cite many reasons, among them leadership problems in the Saigon army, shortages of administrative skills in the 44 provisional governments and the Saigon government's lack of popularity—something even admitted by president Thieu's staunch defenders.

Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1970

Reevaluation of the Vietnamization Program and a New Strategy to Revitalize the Paris Negotiations Clearly Required

DESPITE his recognition of the Paris talks as the preferable route to peace, Nixon seems to be turning away from negotiation and toward Vietnamization as the preferred mechanism to achieve American military disengagement. This approach raises many questions.

One is whether Vietnamization will end the war or merely perpetuate it while transferring a heavier share of the fighting to Saigon's troops. Another is whether it will terminate the American involvement or merely continue it, by cutbacks, at a level more politically bearable in the United States. A third is whether the Saigon government and army can take over all or a major part of the combat and the innumerable other functions now performed by Americans. The final question is what, if anything, Hanoi and the Viet Cong can do or will do to inhibit Vietnamization, and should the program be disrupted, whether a new escalation of the war and of American involvement will follow.

The central issue that emerges is whether there is not a fundamental contradiction between Vietnamization as currently implemented, and bringing the war to a conclusion, which can only be accomplished with Hanoi's consent — which is to say through negotiation.

Reevaluation of the Vietnamization program and a new strategy to revitalize the Paris negotiations are clearly required.

International Herald Tribune
Feb. 6, 1970

A Negotiated Settlement and Formation of a Coalition Government: a Real Possibility

SENATOR **Eugene McCarthy** (Democrat, Minnesota) said that if the Vietnamization program succeeds, "Asians would be killing Asians with American arms."

"We will have made of the Vietnamese army essentially a mercenary army fighting its own people for an unrepresentative government, and beyond that, if we are to accept the Dean Rusk and Nixon statements, to protect or advance the interests of the free world."

McCarthy said Nixon had attempted to confine discussion to only two possible courses of action — immediate withdrawal of all American troops or "his policy of Vietnamization." "A third real possibility is a negotiated political settlement," he said, "followed or accompanied by withdrawal of American military power."...

He said he believed that "there has been no serious negotiations" since the first meetings in Paris in May 1968. "Serious negotiations cannot proceed," he said, "unless we are willing to support a coalition government to control the process of transition" to an elected "permanent government."

Evening Star,
Feb. 19, 1970

P.L.A.F. NEW EXPLOITS

SAIGON AREA

Binh Long: 100 GIs of First Cav. Division and 11th Armoured Regiment, 26 tanks and armoured cars, 3 106.7mm and 81mm mortars put out of action (night of Feb. 25).

Bien Hoa: 235 enemy troops and 31 military vehicles wiped out (from Feb. 1 to 15).

WESTERN HIGH PLATEAUX

Gia Lai: 2 motor convoys ambushed on Road No 19: 100 GIs and South Korean troops and 27 vehicles (10 M.113 and M. 118 armoured cars) knocked out of action (Feb. 25).

Kontum Town: Attack on Special Sector No 24 and Depots No 40 and 41 with heavy damage inflicted on the enemy (Feb. 25).

MEKONG DELTA

My Tho: A platoon of puppet Marines completely wiped out, and a company of puppet 7th Division badly mauled (night of Feb. 24 and Feb. 27).

Can Tho: A Ranger platoon written off the musterroll on the night of Feb 21.

CENTRAL VIET NAM

Binh Dinh: An American company assaulted: 120 casualties, 17 military vehicles (4 tanks) destroyed.

Quang Ngai: 400 enemy troops disabled, 6 aircraft downed, 6 military vehicles blasted out of commission (from Feb. 9 to 15).

Quang Nam: A "sweep" fought back: 180 enemy casualties at Xuyen Tan - Duy Xuyen (from Feb. 11 to 15).

Khanh Hoa: 200 adverse troops wiped out, 5 military vehicles destroyed, 2 aircraft grounded (from Feb. 1 to 7).

600 PEOPLE POISONED BY U.S. CHEMICALS

ON February 21 last, US bombers dropped gas bombs on the villages of Khanh Lam and Van Khanh, about 240 km Southwest of Saigon, in the Gulf of Thailand, *Giai Phong* Press Agency reported. Then toxic chemicals were sprayed on an area 17 km long, poisoning over 600 people. More than 1,000 hectares of cropland were devastated, including orchards, kitchen gardens and eucalyptus forest.

More atrocious still, the aggressors mounted a third raid on the same area during which helicopter gunships strafed those who were helping the victims of the previous raids. The following day, these villagers were napalmed by the Yankees.

Quang Tri guerillas pursuing the enemy

LIBRARY

UNREST IN SAIGON

THE year 1969 ended with a 40-minutes' raid on the "National Assembly" on Dec. 20 by 200 ruffians paid by Thieu-Ky-Khiem. They began the year 1970 by railing at the "advocates of coalition and neutrality" as "murderers" and "traitors" to the country (Jan. 13). These two events show that apart from the mounting enmity between the Saigon puppet administration and the South Vietnamese people, there exist festering antagonisms among the pro-US teams.

The puppet administration did not heed any aspirations of the South Vietnamese people regarding the material and spiritual life. They instituted the austerity taxes, raised the prices of rice and newsprint and set up gambling dens and prostitution centres.

The 100 per cent rice in the price of newsprint had also a political goal: to restrict the number of newspaper readers. In its Feb. 21 issue, the Saigon paper *Su That* (The Truth) wrote: "Newsprint is not a current commodity and therefore a rise in its price would bring in very little revenue for the treasury while inflation was running to 40 or 50 billion piastres." On Feb. 21, all the Saigon newsmen walked out of a meeting where the puppet Minister of Economy tried to explain away this government decision. On Feb. 23, six organizations representing the managers and editors of all Saigon papers issued a communique protesting against that decision and pressing for its immediate cancellation. A journalists' delegation went to see Nguyen Van Thieu. On Feb. 24 and 25 the Saigon-Cho Lon-Gia Dinh Federation of TU, the Transport Workers' TU (representing 60,000 members), the Saigon Dockers' TU, the Railwaymen TU, the Saigon Students' General Association, the Buddhist students and Van Hanh University students also supported the action of the newsmen. On Feb. 27, thirty journalists made it be known that they would shave their head in protest against this move, and six of them already did so at the Saigon Press Centre. On Feb. 28, the Labour Federation (membership: half a million) also sent to the puppet authorities a letter of protest. On March 2, all papers in Saigon began their three-day strike. Parallel to the boosting of the price of newsprint, Thieu-Ky-Khiem set up a "Press Supervision Committee."

In the first two months of 1970, many other fascist measures were taken by the Saigon administration. On Jan. 15, it broke up a peace teach-in held by 300 people at An Quang pagoda. Phan Xuan Huy, an MP in the "Lower House" who attended the meeting had this to say: "The Communists are free to talk peace, but in South Viet Nam only a few people are allowed to touch on that subject." On Jan. 24, Mien Duc Thang, a musician, was sentenced to five years' hard labour, for compositions of his which condemned the war and praised peace, thereby "affecting the morale of the people and soldiers." The Saigon Students' General Association sent a letter protesting against the drafting of 9 students in the puppet army after they had been illegally detained for twelve months (the students had been arrested during a peace procession in Saigon in 1968).

The first two months of 1970 also witnessed Thieu's crack-down on the men who did not see eye to eye with him. On Feb. 7, he ordered the arrest of "representatives" Tran Ngoc Chau and Hoang Ho. On Feb. 25, these "MPs" were sentenced in absentia, the latter to capital punishment and the former to 20 years' hard labour, at a session lasting only 25 minutes, this despite their "parliamentary immunities." On Feb. 26, policemen broke into the "Lower House", stripped Chau of his "medals", and led him away after beating him up. About fifty newsmen present were also manhandled.

Commenting on the political situation in Saigon, *Su That* said on March 2 that it "was reminiscent of that in November 1963" in dictator Ngo Dinh Diem's times.